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Anonymity protocol: Obfuscates the link between 
its private input (anonymous actions)  and its public 
output.
Attacker tries to infer the hidden info from his 
observation of the protocol.Motivations
Extra knowledgeMotivations
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Extra knowledge
Real world: attackers usually gather additional 
information correlated to the anonymous agents 
before attacking the protocol.
Example: two agents voting by “yes” or “no” and the 
result of the vote is {yes, no}
 Agents used different colours but the adversary does not 
know the correlation between the colors and the agents: 
{yes, no} ≡ {yes, no} 
 The adversary knows the correlation: {yes, no} ≠ {yes, no}Motivations
NFC-Enabled Mobile Phones
Security system developed in IBM Zurich Research 
Laboratory to enhance authentication in eBanking 
with NFC-enabled mobile phones [Ortiz-Yepes 09] Motivations
Attacking NFC-EMF
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Attacking NFC-EMF
Social Networks: very easy to 




User’s mother born on 12/07/1969Motivations
“Handless pick-pocket”
User’s mother born on 12/07/1969Motivations
“Handless pick-pocket”
User’s mother born on 12/07/1969
Scan his pocketMotivations
Extra knowledge
Our goal: investigate the impact of the 
attacker's extra knowledge on the 
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“A sender is probably innocent if, from the 
attacker's point of view, the sender appears 
no more likely to be the originator than to not 
be the originator”Probable Innocence
Formal deﬁnition
Members: a total of m members participating in the protocol
 n honest members
 c=(m-n) corrupted members or collaborating attackers
Anonymous events: a random variable A distributed over                  
{a1, a2 …, an}, where ai indicates that the honest user i is the initiator of 
the message.
Observable events: a random variable O distributed over                    
{o1, o2 …, on}, where oi indicates that user i is honest and forwards the 
message to a corrupted user. In this case we say that user i is detected. Deﬁnition [Reiter and Ruben, 98]: a protocol 
satisﬁes probable innocence if
Probable Innocence
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Definition [Halpern and O’Neill, 05]Probable Innocence
Formal deﬁnition
Proposition: if the a priori distribution is uniform then
∀i p(oi | ai) = p(ai | oi) 
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Formal deﬁnition
Proposition: if the a priori distribution is uniform then
∀i p(oi | ai) = p(ai | oi) 
Proof: by Bayes theorem we have
p(oj | ai) p(ai) = p(ai | oj)p(oj)
If A is uniformly distributed then (in Crowds) O is uniformly distributed too.
 Hence p(ai) = p(oj) = 1/nProbable Innocence
extended
Deﬁnition: a protocol satisﬁes α-probable innocence
(0≤ α ≤ 1) if
∀i p(ai | oi) ≤ αVulnerability
[Smith 09]
V(A) = maxi p(ai)
V(A | O) = Σj p(oj) maxi(p(ai | oj))
[In Crowds]
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[Smith 09]
V(A) = maxi p(ai)
V(A | O) = Σj p(oj) maxi(p(ai | oj))
The a priori vulnerability of a random variable A is
The a posteriori vulnerability of a random variable A is
[In Crowds]
∀ i≠j p(ai | oi) > p(aj | oi)Vulnerability
Deﬁnition: a protocol satisﬁes α-vulnerability if
V(A | O) ≤ αVulnerability
Deﬁnition: a protocol satisﬁes α-vulnerability if
V(A | O) ≤ α
Proposition: 
1.α-probable innocence implies α-vulnerability.
2.If the a priori distribution is uniform then the two 












Fixed paths: allows attackers to identify the users’ 
















∀i,k p(ai | oi,sk) ≤ αExtra knowledge
Probable innocence
 Modeling the extra knowledge 
 Extra observables: a random variable S distributed over the 
set    {s1, s2, …, sr}.
 Correlation between S and A: the conditional probabilities 
matrix p(sk | ai).
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 Modeling the extra knowledge 
 Extra observables: a random variable S distributed over the 
set    {s1, s2, …, sr}.
 Correlation between S and A: the conditional probabilities 
matrix p(sk | ai).
 Deﬁnition [Fist attempt]: a protocol satisﬁes α–probable 
innocence in presence of extra knowledge if
∀i,k p(ai | oi,sk) ≤ αExtra knowledge
Probable innocence
Example 1: an instance of Crowds with 6 members 
and 2 servers
5 honest members {1,2,3,4,5}
One attacker {6}
Probability of forwarding (of the biased coin) pf = 3/4
Members {1,2} prefer the ﬁrst server:
       ∀ i∈{1,2} p(s1 | ai) = 3/4 
Members {3,4,5} prefer the second server:
       ∀ i∈{3,4,5} p(s2 | ai) = 3/4Extra knowledge
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Extra knowledge alters the relevance of the detectionExtra knowledge
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Deﬁnition [Safe version]: a protocol satisﬁes  α-probable
innocence in presence of extra knowledge if
∀i,j,k p(ai | oj,sk) ≤ αExtra knowledge
Probable innocence
Proposition [Impact of the extra info]
where   
                        q=mini,j,k (p(sk | oj)/p(sk | ai))
1.∀i,j,k p(ai | oj,sk)  ≤ α if p(ai | oj) ≤ qα
2.If ∀i,j, p(ai | oi) = p(aj | oj) then 
    ∀i,j,k p(ai | oj,sk)  ≤ α iff p(ai | oj) ≤ qαExtra knowledge
Vulnerability
Deﬁnition: a protocol satisﬁes  α-vulnerability in presence 
of extra knowledge if
V(A | O,S) ≤ α
where 
V(A | O,S) = Σj,k p(oj,sk) maxi(p(ai | oj,sk))Extra knowledge
Vulnerability
Proposition [Impact of the extra info] Assume that 
∀i p(oi | ai) = p = maxi,j p(oj | ai) then
1.V(A | O,S) ≤ α if V(A | O) ≤ α/(qr)
2.If the a priori distribution is uniform and                         then
     V(A | O,S) ≤ α iff V(A | O) ≤ α
where
• r = card({s1, s2, …, sr})











 Trust in Crowds
 Extend Crowds protocol with trust:
 Associate to each principal a trust level t ∈ [0,1].
 The forwarding process is governed by a policy where the 
probability of choosing a member depends on her trust level.
 Results:
 Study the impact of such probabilistic behaviour of principals.
 Establish necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for choosing an 
appropriate policy of forwarding between members in order 
to achieve a desired level of privacy.Recent results
 Beliefs
 Open problem: measure and account for the accuracy of the adversary 
extra knowledge.
 Integrate the notion of adversary’s beliefs:
 Assume that both the actual a priori distribution of the hidden input 
and its correlation to the extra information are unknown to the 
adversary.
 Generalise the approach to information ﬂow systems.
 Results:
 New metric for quantitative information ﬂow based on the concept of 
vulnerability that takes into account the adversary's beliefs.
 Our model allows to identify the levels of accuracy for the adversary's 
beliefs which are compatible with the security of a given program or 
protocol.Future work
In many cases the conﬁdentiality scenarios are 
interactive:
Part of the secrets come after observable events and may 
depend on them.
Extend the metric so to capture the dynamic nature of 
interactive protocols.Conclusion
Extra knowledge
Highly likely in the new era of ubiquitous computing 
world
May have a serious impact on the security.
Makes both probable innocence and vulnerability 
more difﬁcult to achieve.
Fundamental issues remain however wide open.